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For the Sake of the Children
A NEW APPROACH TO SECURING
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 25, 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
effectively ruled that any law denying homosexual couples
marriage rights granted to heterosexual couples violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution.1
The court left the legislature with the semantic task of naming
such a legal contract either a “marriage” or a “civil union,”2 but
made clear in a unanimous decision that “committed same-sex
couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and
benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples.”3 Despite
stopping short of mandating the title of “marriage” for
homosexual unions,4 the court in Lewis v. Harris forever
altered the landscape of the gay marriage debate by handing
down the first ever unanimous decision for the plaintiff in a
gay marriage case.5 While the court’s resounding unanimity
1

Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006).
See Tina Kelly, For Gay Couples, Ruling Has a Cash Value, N.Y. TIMES,
October 28, 2006, at B5 (“Gay couples’ rights are less in dispute than a word for
them.”).
3
Lewis, 908 A.2d. at 221.
4
The New Jersey Legislature ultimately chose to implement civil unions,
rather than gay marriage. The new law, effective February 19, 2007, states in part:
2

The Legislature has chosen to establish civil unions by amending the current
marriage statute to include same-sex couples. In doing so, the Legislature is
continuing its longstanding history of insuring equality under the laws for all
New Jersey citizens by providing same-sex couples with the same rights and
benefits as heterosexual couples who choose to marry.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28(f) (2006).
5
All seven justices agreed as to the violation of Equal Protection rights. The
three dissenting justices did not disagree with the majority as to such a violation, but
instead would have gone further, holding that only a state sanctioned institution
termed “marriage” would be sufficient to ensure the fundamental right to marry for
homosexual couples. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224-31 (Poritz, J., concurring in the
holding). Not even the Massachusetts court was as definitive, with only a plurality of
that court holding that gay marriage was required under the Massachusetts
Constitution. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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was remarkable, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the
New Jersey decision was the dicta employed by the court in
reaching its landmark decision. Like no other prior case, the
New Jersey Supreme Court focused extensively on the burdens
faced by the children of homosexual couples denied the right to
marry, rather than restricting its analysis to an examination of
the rights withheld from the couples themselves.6
Just three months prior to the Lewis decision, on July 6,
2006, the State of New York’s highest court decided a gay
marriage case of its own and, like its neighbor New Jersey,
spent a considerable amount of time probing the marital
benefits conferred upon children by the institution of
marriage.7 However, New York’s judges undertook this inquiry
with an eye toward an entirely opposite result and held that
“the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid
instability, in opposite-sex [rather] than in same-sex
relationships.”8 Armed with this analysis, the court ruled that a
law forbidding homosexuals to marry would not offend the
Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution when
held up against a rational review standard.9
The significance of these two cases, this Note will
contend, does not lie in their contrasting results, but in their
similar focus—the effects of marriage upon any child
potentially living with homosexual parents. While the legal
debate over gay marriage has been raging for over ten years,10
this Note will argue that only recently has the debate over gay
marriage evolved into a balancing act that considers not only
the rights of same-sex couples, but also the rights of these
couples’ children. More significantly, this Note will advance the
possibility that this repeated deference to marriage’s third
party, the child, will open up a challenge to anti-gay marriage
laws and constitutional amendments that has not previously

6

See, e.g., Lewis, 908 A.2d at 217 (“[U]nder our current laws, committed
same-sex couples and their children, are not afforded the benefits and protections
available to similar heterosexual households.” (emphasis added)).
7
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
8
Id. at 7.
9
Id.
10
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional
amendment, HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (deciding the first significant gay marriage case
in U.S. history over fourteen years ago).
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been considered: an Equal Protection challenge based on a
child’s right to presumed legitimacy at birth.11
Part II of this Note will review the history of the gay
marriage debate in the courts, from its Hawaiian beginnings in
1993 up to the New Jersey court’s decision in 2006. Special
attention will be paid to the evolution of judicial concerns with
child rearing and the effect of marriage on children. Part III
will briefly survey the history of Equal Protection
jurisprudence related to distinctions drawn on the basis of
illegitimacy. The benefits of presumed legitimacy granted to
children born into wedlock will also be examined. Part IV will
then argue that a child born into a household with same-sex,
unwed parents could contend that laws barring her parents
from marrying are an affront to her Equal Protection rights.
New York will be used as a convenient model for this
examination due to its recent decision upholding an
interpretation of the marriage code as precluding homosexual
marriage. By narrowly focusing on a single state and its laws,
the potential of such a claim by a child may be accurately
assessed. Finally, Part V of this Note will survey the current
landscape of gay marriage nationwide (considering the relevant
legislation and constitutional amendments) to argue that the
New York model proposed in Part IV might be used as a
nationwide attack on gay marriage bans—an attack no longer
waged by the couples, but by their children.
II.

THE GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE—FOURTEEN YEARS
AND COUNTING

Over the years, the judicial focus in gay marriage cases
has slowly begun to turn away from notions of individual
liberty and toward the collective concerns of the family unit.12
11
Presumably, a child of gay parents could base an Equal Protection claim on
any of the benefits afforded to children through the marital status of their parents. The
New Jersey court noted, for example, that a child of a non-biological same-sex parent
could not receive survivor benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act if their
parent was killed at work. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 218. However, this Note will pay special
attention to the benefit of presumed legitimacy because the Supreme Court of the
United States has expressly stated that Equal Protection claims based on legitimacy
distinctions should be afforded intermediate review. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988).
12
Compare Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (holding that “marriage is a basic civil
right”), with Lewis, 908 A.2d at 216 (“[New Jersey’s Domestic Partnership Act] does not
provide to committed same-sex couples the family law protections available to married
couples. The Act provides no comparable presumption of dual parentage to the nonbiological parent of a child born to a domestic partner.”).
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This section tracks that progression to show the everincreasing role children have in the gay marriage conversation.
A.

The Early Murmurs—Hawaii (1993), Alaska (1998),
and Vermont (1999)

In May of 1993, the first truly significant legal battle
over gay marriage13 was decided by the Supreme Court of
Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin.14 The plaintiffs, a collection of
homosexual couples, filed suit alleging that the Director of the
Department of Health unfairly denied their applications for
marriage licenses based on the Department’s stance that the
gendered nouns used in the marriage and consanguinity
statutes of Hawaii proscribed such a license issuance.15 The
plaintiffs alleged that this application of the marriage law
violated their rights to privacy as well as the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Hawaii Constitution.16 The court
gave little credence to the right to privacy and Due Process
claims brought by the plaintiffs based on a finding that the
right to gay marriage was not a fundamental right warranting
protection.17 Importantly, however, the court ruled that the
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the
equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution because the
practice of denying same-sex couples marriage licenses drew
distinctions based on gender.18
This ruling of the Supreme Court of Hawaii marked the
first significant judicial challenge to the traditional
interpretation of marriage law in the United States.19 When
13

In January of 1993, Dean v. District of Columbia, Civil Act No. 90-13892,
1992 WL 685364, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff’d 653 A.2d 307 (1995), was
decided, holding that any claims to gay marriage rights were not protected under the
Federal Constitution. While this is significant, the Hawaii decision showed that a state
constitutional challenge could prove successful. As such the bulk of cases dealing with
gay marriage has been, and continues to be, fought in the state courts.
14
852 P.2d 44.
15
Id. at 48-49.
16
Id. at 50.
17
Id. at 57.
18
Id. at 67. The court also held that the sex based classifications would be
held to a strict scrutiny standard in the state of Hawaii, meaning that the marriage
law in question necessitated a compelling state interest and a narrow tailoring of the
law to meet that interest. Id.
19
LOWELL TONG, Comparing Mixed-Race and Same-Sex Marriage, in ON THE
ROAD TO SAME SEX MARRIAGE 109, 119 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell eds., 1998)
(“Although there were previous attempts to recognize same-sex unions legally, a case
heard by the Hawaii State Supreme Court, Baehr v. Lewin in 1993, is considered to be
a landmark case.”).
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assessing the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Hawaii
court noted the various disadvantages facing homosexual
couples who are denied marriage rights granted to married
heterosexual couples: tax advantages, public assistance from
the Department of Human Services, control of community
property, inheritance rights, the right to spousal support, the
right to name change, post-divorce rights, the spousal privilege
granted pursuant to the Rule of Evidence, and the right to
bring a wrongful death action.20 While this list was presumably
not meant to be exhaustive, it curiously makes mention of only
one right related to child rearing, the right to an “award of
child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings.”21
In fact, the only other mentions of children in the court’s
opinion were made when the court discussed case law
regarding the right to privacy22 (not the claim upon which the
court rested its opinion) and when the court restated the
Department of Health’s opinion that the denial of gay marriage
rights protects the type of family unit that provides “a
nurturing environment to children born to married persons,” a
claim to which the court did not respond.23 Based on this paltry
reference to the role of children in the same-sex marriage
equation, it is fair to say that in May of 1993, this court’s
attention was not keenly focused on the rights of children
reared by homosexual parents.24
In 1998, Alaska became the second state to tackle the
issue of gay marriage in the courts.25 In Brause v. Bureau of
Vital Statistics, the Superior Court of Alaska faced an even
stronger challenge than the Supreme Court of Hawaii.26 Where
the Hawaii court in Baehr ruled on a statute that implicitly
forbade gay marriage by use of gender specific terms, the
20

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59.
Id.
22
Id. at 56.
23
Id. at 52.
24
Of course, the reason may be that gay parents were either marginally
existent or existed outside of the public consciousness. However, the reason for this
omission is insignificant; the fact remains that in the earliest case in the gay marriage
debate, the children affected stood by in the shadows.
25
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional
amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25.
26
Compare Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (“[W]e have not held . . . the appellants
have a civil right to a same sex marriage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (“The court finds that marriage, i.e., the recognition of
one’s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.”).
21
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Brause court was faced with a statute that expressly forbade
gay marriage.27 The plaintiffs in Brause contested an Alaskan
law that defined marriage as between a man and a woman.28
With the stronger prohibition came a stronger ruling from the
court, and the Alaska judiciary struck down the Marriage Code
at issue when it held that “marriage, i.e., the recognition of
one’s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.”29 The
Brause court saw the gay marriage issue primarily as an issue
of personal liberty;30 as such, the court never considered the
benefits that a recognized marriage affords to any of the
affected parties—partners and children alike.31
Finally, in 1999, the first gay marriage case to ever
significantly deal with the rights and securities granted to
children through marriage was decided in Vermont.32 In Baker
v. Vermont, three homosexual couples brought suit against the
state after each couple had been denied a marriage license from
their town clerk.33 The State contended that “the Legislature
[was] justified . . . ‘in using the marriage statutes to send a
public message that procreation and child rearing are
intertwined.’”34 Plaintiffs offered numerous theories of recovery,
including an assertion that the plain language of the Vermont
marriage statute allowed for gay marriage.35 However, the
holding, which ultimately granted marriage rights, was not
grounded in the right to privacy, the Federal Equal Protection
Clause or the due process clause of the Vermont Constitution,
but rather in the novel common benefits clause36 that is unique
27
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (citing ALASKA MARRIAGE CODE
§ 25.05.011(a)).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at *3. In fact, the precedent upon which the Brause court premised its
decision was a ruling 30 years prior, holding it unconstitutional for public schools to set
hair length limitations on its students. See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 175 (Alaska
1972).
31
The Brause decision is decidedly the shortest gay marriage decision in
American jurisprudence. The court quickly held that marriage is a fundamental right
and therefore did not address any of the other arguments that are hallmarks of other
major gay marriage cases. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4.
32
See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 884-85 (Vt. 1999).
33
Id. at 867.
34
Id. at 881.
35
Id. at 868-70.
36
The common benefits clause reads:

That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of
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to the State of Vermont.37 Regardless of this anomalous
posturing, it is nonetheless significant that Vermont became
the first state to recognize that the concerns expressed by
homosexual couples included protection of their children’s
rights:
They [plaintiff-couples] argue that the large number of married
couples without children, and the increasing incidence of same-sex
couples with children, undermines the State’s rationale [for denying
gay marriage]. They note that Vermont law affirmatively guarantees
the right to adopt and raise children regardless of the sex of the
parents, see 15A V.S.A. § 1-102, and challenge the logic of a
legislative scheme that recognizes the rights of same-sex partners as
parents, yet denies them—and their children—the same security as
spouses.38

The court adopted the plaintiffs’ argument regarding the rights
of children in making its ruling and noted that “the exclusion of
same-sex couples from the legal protections incident to
marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that the
State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure
against.”39
Ultimately, the court held that same-sex couples were
entitled to “the same benefits and protections afforded by
Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples,”40 but reserved to
the legislature the right to craft laws facilitating this mandate.
However, the true seismic shift in this case was the court’s
willingness to turn the State’s interest in protecting children
into an argument favoring same-sex marriage.41 The court
persons, who are a part only of that community; and that the community
hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform or alter
government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged most
conducive to the public weal.
VT. CONST. art. 7.
37
Baker, 744 A.2d at 870, 880-86 (“[I]t is the Common Benefits Clause of the
Vermont Constitution we are construing, rather than its counterpart, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . .
[T]he Common Benefits Clause . . . differs markedly from the federal Equal Protection
Clause in its language, historical origins, purpose, and development.”).
38
Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
39
Id. at 882 (emphasis omitted).
40
Id. at 886. Ultimately, the Vermont Legislature rejected gay marriage in
favor of civil unions. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2002).
41
The court stated:
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are of such
significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on
public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of
the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. Considered in light of the
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recognized that “a significant number of children today are
actually being raised by same-sex parents, and that increasing
numbers of children are being conceived by such parents” and
refused to accept the State’s argument that its interest in
promoting procreation was a compelling justification for
denying same-sex marriage rights.42 Instead, the court clearly
drew the opposite conclusion and stated that “to the extent that
the state’s purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to
legitimize children and provide for their security, the statutes
plainly exclude many same-sex couples who are no different
from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives.”43 It
was this logic, adopted by the Baker court on December 20,
1999, that truly gave force to the gay marriage debate.44
B.

The Exclamation—The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (2003)

With Vermont’s historic adoption of civil unions, the
momentum seemed to be building toward a possible recognition
of full same-sex marriage rights within the United States. And
then, in 2003, along came Massachusetts.45 The Massachusetts
extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes
of the law—protecting children and ‘furthering the link between procreation
and child rearing’—the exclusion falls substantially short of this standard.
The laudable governmental goal of promoting a commitment between
married couples to promote the security of their children and the community
as a whole provides no reasonable basis for denying the legal benefits and
protections of marriage to same-sex couples, who are no differently situated
with respect to this goal than their opposite-sex counterparts.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (emphasis omitted).
42
Id. at 881, 884.
43
Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
44
In 1998, both Alaska and Hawaii passed constitutional amendments,
essentially erasing each state’s holdings with regard to gay marriage. See ALASKA
CONST. art. 1, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only
between one man and one woman.”); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (“The legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
It is interesting to note that it was in Vermont, with the judiciary’s unique
recognition of gay couples as parents in Baker, that gay marriage rights, in the form of
civil unions, first gained real traction.
45
From a historical perspective, it is not surprising that Massachusetts was
the first state to allow gay marriage as the state’s marriage law was always premised
on marriage being a secular institution:
It was clear to Plymouth . . . that the best way to avoid interference from the
High Church party that controlled early seventeenth century England was to
keep as free as possible from political and religious affiliation with England’s
government. Ministers of the established church were at that time the only
authorized celebrants of marriage in England; in Plymouth, following the
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court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
remains the only case in the United States to have granted full
marriage rights to homosexual couples.46 The ruling came on
the heels of the major Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v.
Texas.47 However, as will be seen, the Goodridge court was less
concerned with the notions of personal choice that underpinned
the Lawrence decision and more influenced by the Baker court’s
perception of marriage as an institution for child rearing.48
In June of 2003, the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Lawrence that the right to privacy, rooted in the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution, precludes the government of any
state from interfering in the private sexual choices made by
consenting individuals.49 Specifically, the Court overturned
anti-sodomy laws in Texas that were primarily directed toward
homosexual conduct.50 Some scholars immediately read the
custom with which the colonists had become familiar in Holland, civil
ceremonies only were countenanced.
FRED S. HALL & MARY E. RICHMOND, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE 22-23 (1929). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge echoed such a historical
understanding of the marriage code: “In Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since
pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular
institution.” Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).
Furthermore, some analysts saw the struggle for gay marriage in
Massachusetts as having “roots that go back at least to 1989, when the Commonwealth
became the second state in the nation (after Wisconsin in 1982) to include sexual
orientation in statewide laws banning discrimination in employment and public
accommodations.” DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
34 (2006).
46
See, e.g., Cece Cox, To Have and To Hold—Or Not: The Influence of the
Christian Right on Gay Marriage Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the United
States, 14 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 6 (2005) (“Currently, only one of the fifty states, Massachusetts, has
recognized gay marriage.”). See generally Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
47
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding unconstitutional Texas laws prohibiting
sodomy).
48
Compare Baker, 744 A.2d at 882 (“[T]he exclusion of same-sex couples from
the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks
that the State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure against.” (emphasis
omitted)), with Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (“Excluding same-sex couples from civil
marriage . . . does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the
immeasurable advantages that flow [through marriage].”).
That Massachusetts would confront marriage law from a similar viewpoint
as one of its New England neighbors is consistent with the history of the region. See
Hall, supra note 45, at 22 (“Beginning with Massachusetts, we find that it shares with
the entire New England group of states a development different from that of all other
sections of the country.”).
49
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“[I]ndividual decisions . . . concerning the
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a
form of ‘liberty’ protected by [the Due Process Clause]” (quoting Bowers v Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
50
Justice Kennedy wrote:
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ruling to suggest that “[i]f a state singles out gays for
unprecedentedly harsh treatment, the Court will presume
what is going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than moral
disapproval . . . plac[ing] all antigay laws under suspicion.”51
This perception, coupled with the timing of the Massachusetts
ruling in Goodridge52 only five months later, made it easy to
assume there was a causal connection between the two
rulings.53 Indeed, the Massachusetts court immediately
referenced the Lawrence decision in the second paragraph of its
ruling in Goodridge.54 However, the substance of the
Massachusetts ruling owes less of a debt to the Supreme Court
than it does to the Baker decision from Vermont.55
In Goodridge, seven couples challenged the Department
of Health’s decision to refuse to issue marriage licenses to the
same-sex couples.56 The same-sex partners had met all the
express requirements of the marriage code necessary to obtain
a license; however, the Department of Health rejected their
applications based on the Department’s understanding that
Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriage.57 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the ordinary

The [anti-sodomy] statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals . . . . When sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice.
Id. at 567.
51
Symposium, Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1017,
1019 (2004).
52
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941. Goodridge was decided in November of
2003; the Lawrence Court made its ruling the preceding June. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
558.
53
In fact, this seems to be a popular common perception. See David Moats,
CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 265 (2004) (“The court’s reasoning in the
Lawrence case paralleled the reasoning of the plaintiffs in the Goodridge case,
particularly in its emphasis on the right to privacy in decisions about intimate
conduct.”); see also Same-Sex Marriage Status in the United States by Statute,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_state_laws_on_same-sex_unions (“In 2003, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas paved the way for same-sex marriage to
emerge as a hot-button political issue. Since Massachusetts became the first state to
legalize same-sex marriage in 2004, other states have rushed to either restrict or
liberalize their own marriage laws.”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
54
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (“Our obligation is to define liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code.” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571)).
55
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
56
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
57
Id. at 950.
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usage of the term “marriage,” when used by the legislature in
the marriage code, did preclude homosexual marriage.58
However, the court went on to say that because the state had
no rational basis for denying same-sex couples the right to
marry, the practice of denying marriage licenses to homosexual
partners was a violation of equal protection under the
Massachusetts Constitution.59 In the course of this
determination, the court’s repeated references to the children
of homosexual partners were truly fascinating.
Reasoning related to the equal protection of children
raised by gay parents, unseen before Vermont’s decision in
Baker,60 permeates the Goodridge decision.61 The Vermont court
held that the impositions placed upon the children of gay
parents undermined the state’s purported interest in
differentiating between straight and gay couples’ marriage
rights.62 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took this
concept further and found that such a detriment to these
children was an affirmative reason to view gay marriage as a
civil right.63 When making its determination the court
recognized:
[M]arital children reap a measure of family stability and economic
security based on their parents’ legally privileged status that is
largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital
children. Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced
approval that still attends the status of being a marital child. Others
are material, such as the greater ease of access to family-based State
and Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one’s
parentage.64

Viewing the issue through this child-centered lens, the court
concluded, “It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons . . .
that civil marriage has long been termed a ‘civil right.’”65
58

Id. at 953.
Id. at 961.
60
See supra Part II.A.
61
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (“Excluding same-sex couples from civil
marriage will not make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does
prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that
flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family structure in which children will be reared,
educated, and socialized.’” (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting))); id. at 963 (“[T]he task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made
infinitely harder by their status as outliers to the marriage laws.”).
62
See supra Part II.A.
63
See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956-57.
64
Id.
65
Id.
59
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Furthermore,
the
Goodridge
court
took
the
unprecedented step of enumerating certain parental rights as
“benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license.”66
Specifically, the court explicitly recognized that “[e]xclusive
marital benefits that are not directly tied to property rights
include the presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of
children born to a married couple.”67 It is largely due to this
type of consideration—a broad view of marriage as a parental
construct—that enabled the Goodridge court to find that no
legislative rationale for anti-gay marriage laws could survive
even a rational basis examination.68 The court therefore found
it unnecessary to consider the plaintiff-couple’s argument that
their case merited a stricter standard of review.69
Ultimately, the Massachusetts court summarily rejected
the Department of Health’s proposed legislative rationales.70
The court concluded that “[e]xcluding same-sex couples from
civil marriage will not make children of opposite-sex couples
marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of samesex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that
flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family structure in which
children will be reared, educated, and socialized.’”71 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, without ever
expressly citing the case, built on the dicta in Baker v. Vermont
to reach its finding that “barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because that person would marry a person of the same sex
violates” equal protection.72 While the press and the public were
acutely aware of the benefits that homosexual couples had
gained after Goodridge, most everyone neglected, and

66

Id. at 955.
Id. at 956 (emphasis added).
68
“Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not
consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.” Id. at
961.
69
Id.
70
The Court wrote:
67

The department posits three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex
couples from marrying: (1) providing a “favorable setting for procreation”;
(2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department
defines as “a two-parent family with one parent of each sex”; and (3)
preserving scarce State and private financial resources.
Id.
71
72

Id. at 964.
Id. at 969.
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continues to neglect, the consideration of children’s rights that
swayed the plurality.73 As Goodridge remains the only case in
the United States to grant full marriage rights to homosexuals,
its reasoning is a touchtone for the gay marriage debate that
seemingly must be either expounded upon or discredited.
Therefore, Goodridge’s treatment of marriage’s effects on the
children of gay parents will be central to any challenges
brought by opponents of gay marriage prohibitions.
C.

The Aftermath—Arizona, Indiana, New York, and
New Jersey (2004-2006)

The backlash against the Goodridge decision was
immediate and fierce,74 and perhaps inevitable.75 Prior to the
ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court in late 2006, courts
across the country that were faced with the gay marriage
question seemed to be riding the political pendulum’s swing
away from the Vermont and Massachusetts trend. Courts in
Arizona,76 Indiana,77 and New York78 all upheld statutory
schemes barring gay marriage. Even the appellate court in
New Jersey upheld a statutory interpretation of the marriage
code as prohibiting gay marriage,79 although the New Jersey
State Supreme Court ultimately overturned its ruling in Lewis
v. Harris.80 However, as the momentum of the debate shifted
73

See, e.g., Jason McLure, Tears of Joy, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 2003.
One year after Goodridge, in the November election, thirteen states
approved constitutional amendments banning gay marriage, nullifying the prospect of
judicial interference. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An
Interpretive Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17
REGENT U. L. REV. 221, 221 (2005). In total today, “more than 35 states have
introduced legislation aimed at preserving the traditional definition of marriage as a
union between a man and a woman.” Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay
Marriage Laws (updated Nov. 3, 2004), Stateline.org, http://www.stateline.org/live/
ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=15576.
75
See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning
from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493
(2006) (comparing the legal and social backlash against desegregation in light of Brown
v. Board of Education with the recent backlash following Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (And Goodridge), 104 MICH.
L. REV. 431 (2005) (same).
76
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 463
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
77
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. App. 2005).
78
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006); see discussion supra
Part I.
79
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 271, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005),
modified, 908 A.2d 196 (2006).
80
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006); see discussion supra Part I.
74
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toward a rejection of gay marriage rights (as evidenced by
victories in courts across the country), the judicial focus in
these cases appeared to remain the same; the central question
continued, and continues, to be “what is best for the children?”
For example, in Standhardt v. Superior Court, the
Arizona Court of Appeals took a particularly questionable
bright-line approach in this regard, upholding the prohibition
of gay marriage, while nonetheless admitting to the inequities
visited upon the children of gay parents caused by the
decision.81 The case revolved around a familiar tale: a
homosexual couple applied for a marriage license and their
application was denied.82 The couple appealed directly to the
Arizona Court of Appeals and the court chose to exercise
jurisdiction.83 As in Goodridge and Baker, the case primarily
hinged upon whether the Legislature of the state could show a
rational basis for a state law barring gay marriage.84 As seen
before, the state premised its rationale for barring gay
marriage on “encouraging procreation and child-rearing within
the stable environment traditionally associated with marriage”
and contended that “limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
is rationally related to that interest.”85 The plaintiffs, as
expected, argued that the law was both over- and underinclusive because not all heterosexual couples have children,
while numerous gay couples do raise children.86 The court
conceded that the plaintiffs’ position was persuasive.87
However, despite the concession, the court stated, “A perfect fit
is not required under the rational basis test, and [the court]
will not overturn a statute merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality.”88
The Arizona court brazenly admitted that deference to
the state’s purported legislative intent would result in “some
inequality.”89 What is vastly more striking, however, is that the
81

Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 454.
83
“We accept jurisdiction over this special action because there is no equally
plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal.” Id.
84
The court held that because the right to same-sex marriage was not a
fundamental right, the standard of review should be the minimal test. Id. at 460-61.
85
Id. at 461.
86
Id. at 462.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
82
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court went on to specify exactly what demographic would suffer
at the hands of this inequality: children, the very group the
state claimed it was trying to protect.90 The court stated:
Children raised in families headed by a same-sex couple deserve and
benefit from bilateral parenting within long-term, committed
relationships just as much as children with married parents. Thus,
children in same-sex families could benefit from the stability offered
by same-sex marriage, particularly if such children do not have ties
with both biological parents. But although the line drawn between
couples who may marry (opposite-sex) and those who may not (samesex) may result in some inequity for children raised by same-sex
couples, such inequity is insufficient to negate the State’s link
between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.91

The Arizona Court of Appeals may be right in its final
analysis.92 However, this admitted inequality raises a unique
question. Specifically, if the marriage laws of a state do in fact
treat children differently based on the nature of their family
unit, might such disadvantaged children have a cause of action
in opposition to anti-gay marriage legislation?93
III.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION
BASED ON ILLEGITIMACY

As suggested, it is conceivable that a child of gay
parents may attempt an equal protection attack on anti-gay

90

Id. at 463.
Id. (emphasis added).
92
While it is not addressed directly, the court appears to be correct that
unequal treatment of a group that is not a party to the action cannot save the plaintiff’s
claim if the court does indeed believe that promoting heterosexual unions is a
legitimate government purpose. The children simply have no standing to seek redress
for the admitted harm. Therefore, if the children are not a party to the action, the fact
that they suffer unequal treatment under the law does little to bolster the plaintiffcouple’s claim of disparate treatment.
93
The Court of Appeals in Indiana offered a novel explanation for its own
adoption of this inequitable scheme in Morrison v. Sadler. 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005). There, the court reasoned that because same-sex couples must become
parents by virtue of costly adoptions or artificial reproductive means, the children of
such gay parents are, by necessity, being brought into families with a monetary and
emotional commitment to having a child, ensuring some measure of stability. On the
other hand, because opposite-sex couples may inadvertently become pregnant, the
Legislature has an interest in inducing such accidental parents into a marriage
relationship that will provide greater security for the child. See id.
While this argument is admittedly clever, it does not deny the unequal
protection under the law faced by the children of gay parents, discussed infra Parts IIIIV. Rather, the Indiana court has merely provided a fascinating justification for the
inequality.
91
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marriage laws.94 This section will explore one possible avenue
for bringing such a claim: inequitable treatment based on
illegitimacy. If such an attack were mounted, it would be
desirable to argue that anti-gay marriage laws discriminate
against the children of gay parents on the basis of illegitimacy
because such claims carry an established heightened standard
of review, namely, intermediate review.95
The Supreme Court “consistently has invalidated laws
that deny a benefit to all nonmarital children that is accorded
to all marital children.”96 It has also been noted that, as the
Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. stated, “[N]o
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate
child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring
the parent.”97 It is therefore clear that federal jurisprudence
frowns upon laws that draw distinctions between legitimate
and illegitimate children.98 But what about a law, like the
traditional marriage code, that provides unequal access to the
right to be considered “legitimate” at birth? Whether the
traditional man-woman marriage code violates equal protection
by denying the children of same-sex couples the opportunity to
be considered the legitimate child of both same-sex parents at
birth is a difficult question. A look at the traditional
application of the intermediate standard of review in
illegitimacy cases provides some insight.
In 1988, the Supreme Court heard the case of Clark v.
Jeter, a case that concerned a Pennsylvania statute that
required paternity suits to be brought within six years of the
birth of an illegitimate child.99 In holding that the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution, the Court explicitly applied the intermediate
94
It is likely that any such suit would be brought on behalf of the child by the
parent. A general Equal Protection claim could be brought by the unmarried parents at
any time; however, arguing unequal application of presumed legitimacy would be
notably difficult, as the child would not be able to bring suit until after birth, at which
point the presumption of legitimacy from birth will have become moot. However, this
situation is similar to other cases in that it involves a claim that it is capable of
repetition, but evading review. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); S. Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1919). For the purpose of conjecturing about
the possibility of such a claim, this Note will simply presume that standing to bring the
lawsuit may be established under this standard.
95
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
96
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 9.6, at 749 (2d ed. 2002); see, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
97
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
98
See, e.g., Clark, 486 U.S. 456.
99
Id.
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standard of review, which requires a substantial relation
between the challenged legislation and an important
government objective in order to withstand scrutiny.100 The
Court’s consideration of that link notably contemplated the
financial concerns related to child rearing. The Court wrote:
[I]t is questionable whether Pennsylvania’s 6-year period is
reasonable . . . since such a mother [with an illegitimate child] might
realize only belatedly a loss of income attributable to the need to
care for the child; and since financial difficulties are likely to
increase as the child matures and incurs additional expenses.101

Evidently, optimizing the financial security of children is one
consideration to be made when applying intermediate scrutiny
in the illegitimacy context. This concern surely applies to a
child of same-sex parents who, in the absence of legitimization
under the marriage laws of the state, has only one parent
legally obligated to support her in the event her same-sex
parents should separate.102
Furthermore, the Court has given illegitimacy a
heightened standard of review because children born
illegitimately cannot change their status after birth.103 So what
of children born to gay or lesbian parents who desire to be
married but are prevented by law? The children born into these
relationships are essentially conferred the status of
“illegitimate” as a function of law.104 To be sure, an argument
could be made that because jurisprudence condemns
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate children,
there is little worry that children forced into an illegitimate
birth by anti-gay marriage laws will suffer ill effects. However,
it is equally plausible that the courts, relying on case law
forbidding unfair disadvantages for illegitimate children,105
would look with similar disfavor upon laws that create, by

100

Id. at 461.
Id. at 456-57.
102
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2004); see
also Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for
Lesbian Co-Partners, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (2004) (discussing the problems of
custody and visitation of children when a same-sex partnership dissolves).
103
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 748.
104
It is not entirely clear whether children born to married lesbians would be
considered “legitimate” by definition, but it is clear that such children have no chance
to be legitimized if the parents are barred from marrying. See infra Part IV for further
discussion of whether a child born to gay parents could ever be considered “legitimate.”
105
See generally Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); N.J. Welfare Rights
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1972).
101
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virtue of exclusion, this very distinction between similarly
situated children.106 For example, when a man and woman are
married and the woman conceives via artificial insemination
from a sperm donor, although the child will not be the
biological child of the husband, there will still be a presumption
of legitimacy that flows through the marriage to that child.107
However, for a lesbian couple, if one of the partners is
artificially inseminated by a donor, there will be no
presumption that the non-birth-giving woman is the legitimate
parent of the child.108
The idea of two women sharing the status of legitimate
parent is not entirely foreign to the law. A California case,
Johnson v. Calvert,109 opened the door to such a legal
possibility. In Johnson, the court found two women to be the
legal mothers of the same child, without the requirement of
adoption proceedings.110 A woman provided her egg to be
implanted in a surrogate.111 After relations between the
biological mother and the surrogate deteriorated, litigation was
initiated to determine who had a legal right to the child.112 The
court determined that California law allowed for motherhood to
be established either by a showing of genetic relationship or
through proof of actual childbirth.113 Ultimately, the court
determined that the woman who had donated her egg was the
mother entitled to the child, based primarily on the weight of
the parties’ intent.114

106

For an overall examination of legitimacy as it pertains to gay marriage, see
generally Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage
Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373
(2007).
107
See, e.g., 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Domestic Relations § 843 (“There is a
presumption that a child born in wedlock, that is, while the mother was united to a
husband in marriage, including a valid common-law marriage, is legitimate.”).
108
While it may seem controversial that two women can be the legitimate
parents of the same child, such a statement would not contradict the plain meaning of
the word. “Legitimate” is defined as “conceived or born of parents legally married” or
more generally as “sanctioned by law or custom.” WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH
CENTURY DICTIONARY 1035 (2d ed. 1983). In other words, legitimacy is that which the
law makes legitimate.
109
851 P.2d 776 (1993).
110
Id. at 781.
111
Id. at 778.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 781.
114
Id. at 782; see also ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS
1055 (4th ed. 2004).
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The result in Johnson led two lesbian partners to test
the limits of the ruling’s application.115 One of the female
partners provided the egg, while the other carried and gave
birth to the child; their legal intent was that both be considered
the mothers of the child, and accordingly a California judge
“issued a pre-birth decree recognizing both women as the
child’s legal mothers.”116 While this conclusion is likely unique
to the California jurisdiction, it does lend credence to the
theory that two women, as partners, can legally be the
legitimate parents of a single child.117 So how might a child of
gay parents bring an action claiming that this denial of the
presumption of legitimacy violates equal protection?
IV.

THE HYPOTHETICAL CHALLENGE

Operating under these newly arrived at assumptions—
that two women can legally be the legitimate parents of a child
at birth and that denying such a child this presumption of
legitimacy may give rise to an intermediate standard of judicial
review—this section will now consider the substance of an
Equal Protection challenge brought on behalf a child.
A.

Background

As a foundational matter, it is important to recognize
the realities of gay parenting in the United States today.
According to a U.S. census report published in February of
2003, approximately twenty-two percent of cohabitating male
partners are raising a child under the age of eighteen, while
115
The lesbian couple in question was Linda McAllister and Leslee Subak. For
further description of the couple, their son Max, and their case in general, see Osborne,
supra note 102, at 371 n.57. As of late 2004, McAllister and Subak continued to live
happily together, raising their son Max, who appears to live the normal life of a fiveyear-old, despite having the distinction of being the first child with two mothers legally
conferred the title of “mom” as a result of a pre-birth decree. See Tomas Van Houtryve,
The Gayby Boomers, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4159/is_20041107/ai_n12761783 (“Leslee
and Linda tell me that the pre-school [Max] attend[s] has many other children from
same-sex parents. The youngsters can relate to their playmates and fit in easily.”).
116
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 114, at 1055 (citing Carol Ness, Lesbian Moms
Gain Rights, S.F. EXAMINER, May 2, 1999, at A1).
117
Note that while much of the discussion that follows operates under the
hypothetical of two lesbian women having a child who brings an Equal Protection suit,
if gay marriage were extended to lesbian women as a result of such a suit, the
government would be virtually required to grant homosexual marriage rights to men
based on typical gender-based Equal Protection grounds completely apart from the
considerations of children put forth herein.
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approximately thirty-three percent of cohabitating female
partners are raising a minor child.118 These percentages hold
true regardless of the geographic region of the country.119 For
example, “[t]he South had the highest percentage [of lesbian
partners] with [their] own [child] under 18 years of age (34%),
while the Northeast had the lowest (31%).”120 In fact, one
commentator concluded the census data indicated same-sex
couples were living in 96% of the counties in the United
States.121 If one in four of those couples are raising children, as
indicated by the census, it is reasonable to assume that
virtually every county in the United States is home to one or
more sets of homosexual parents.122
Furthermore, despite the discontent of certain groups,123
the vast majority of states allow children to be adopted by
same-sex couples.124 Only one state, Florida, forbids gay parents
from adopting,125 making it fair to say that standard practice
around the country is to allow gay parents to raise children.
Moreover, the right to procreate has long been established as a
fundamental right that no governmental action is allowed to
contravene.126 With these facts not in question, it is fair to draw
three conclusions. First, because the right to procreate has
been deemed a fundamental right, homosexual parents have an
undisputed right to give birth via artificial insemination or
otherwise.127 Second, homosexual parents cannot be denied
adoption rights simply because of their sexual orientation.128
118
See TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O’CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CENSR-5, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, 9 (2003).
119
Id. The census figures subdivide the country into four regions: Northeast,
Midwest, South, and West. The figures for each of the four regions are within two
percentage points of the national average. Id.
120
Id. at 10.
121
See Michael Wilke, Research Booms on Same-Sex Couples, THE GULLY,
May 28, 2004, http://www.thegully.com/essays/gay_mundo2/wilke/040528_gay_US_
census.html (citing GARY GATES ET AL., THE GAY & LESBIAN ATLAS (2004)) (last visited
Oct. 5, 2007).
122
Id.; see also SIMMONS & O’CONNELL, supra note 118, at 9.
123
See, e.g., Lucy Ward, Anger at “Cheap Gimmick” of Anti-Gay Adoption
Card, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2002, available at http://society.guardian.co.uk/
adoption/story/0,,812594,00.html (describing novelty donor-style cards released by a
Christian group which read, “In the event of my death I do not want my children to be
adopted by homosexuals”).
124
The only state with an explicit ban on homosexual adoption is Florida. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (2003); see also Osbourne, supra note 102, at 368.
125
See supra note 124.
126
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
127
See id.
128
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (2007).
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And third, homosexual parents exist in considerable numbers
and are raising children in the United States today.129
B.

New York as a Model

The laws and demographics of New York State fall
completely in line with the foregoing principles. New York
adoption regulations specifically state, “Applicants shall not be
rejected solely on the basis of homosexuality.”130 The term
“family” has even been defined by the New York court for the
purpose of rent control statutes; the judiciary has stated “the
term family . . . should not be rigidly restricted to those people
who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for
instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order.”131 Rather,
the court held as a matter of policy that the law’s protection
should focus on the “reality of family life.”132 The court used this
definition to hold that a deceased man’s homosexual partner
had the right to assert a familial relationship to the decedent
for the purpose of avoiding eviction when his partner, the lease
holder, had passed away.133 In light of this precedent, there can
be little doubt that New York courts recognize, if not encourage
(particularly in the state adoption laws), the existence of
homosexual family units raising children.134
However, the New York court, in Hernandez v. Robles,
ruled that gay marriage may be barred by statute in part
because “[t]he Legislature could rationally believe that it is
better . . . for children to grow up with both a mother and a
father.”135 But based on the adoption laws of the state, it does
not appear that the legislature actually believes that oppositesex couples are necessarily better equipped to raise children.136
Rather, what the law of New York clearly evinces is that the
“best interests” of children should be protected.137
129

See SIMMONS & O’CONNELL, supra note 118, at 9.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 421.16(h)(2) (2007).
131
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53 (N.Y.1989).
132
Id.
133
Id at 53-54.
134
See, e.g., In re Jacob, An Infant, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (holding
that the purpose of the adoption law is to “encourag[e] the adoption of as many children
as possible regardless of the sexual orientation or marital status of the individuals
seeking to adopt them”); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2)
(2007).
135
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
136
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 421.16(h)(2) (2007).
137
Id.
130
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In In re Adoption of Evan, for example, a woman’s
lesbian partner was allowed to adopt her biological son because
the court viewed the adoption as “in Evan’s best interest.”138
Evan’s best interests were served in that case because allowing
said lesbian partner to adopt
would serve only to provide him with important legal rights which
he does not presently possess. It would afford him additional
economic security because [his mother’s partner] would become
legally obligated to support him. He would also be entitled to inherit
from [his mother’s partner] and her family under the law of intestate
succession and be eligible for social security benefits in the event of
her disability or death. Of immediate practical import, he would be
able to participate in the medical and educational benefits provided
by her employment, which are more generous than those possessed
by [his biological mother].139

The court found it clear that the financial and emotional
benefits of a two-parent household were in the best interest of a
child;140 what is not entirely clear is whether gay marriage
would confer those benefits as of right, circumnavigating the
need for costly adoptions.141
1. Determining the Standard
Suppose that a child born to gay parents, seeking the
full financial benefits of a two-parent household already
recognized by the New York courts, challenges the law that
barred her parents from marrying before her birth, thereby
precluding her from the benefits of presumed legitimacy. As
discussed, her best claim would be that the law unreasonably
violated her equal protection rights by discriminating based on
illegitimacy.142 Once the equal protection claim is brought,
discrimination based on illegitimacy would need to be shown in
order to establish the application of intermediate scrutiny
attendant to illegitimacy claims.143 The need to avoid costly
cross-adoption proceedings is a powerful argument showing the
unequal application of the law. Currently, once a child is born
138

In re Adoption of a Child Whose First Name Is Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997,

999 (1992).
139

Id. at 998-99 (citations omitted).
Id.
141
See Kelley, supra note 2, at B1 (questioning how the New Jersey court’s
decision will affect one lesbian partner’s ability to adopt, without financial cost, a child
being carried by the other partner).
142
See supra Part III.
143
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
140
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to gay parents (particularly lesbian partners), the non-birthgiving partner can legally adopt in order to provide the child
with all the rights attendant to a natural parent.144 However,
this process can be long and expensive and may create a
deterrent or, in many cases, a complete financial barrier.145 The
children of heterosexual couples face no such barriers to
receiving the full financial support of their parents; the
heterosexual couple need only marry before the birth of the
child, and there is a legal presumption that the child is
legitimate.146
This disparate treatment of unborn children, based
solely on their parents’ access to the benefits of the marriage
law, is ripe to be contested on Equal Protection grounds.
Section 24 of the New York Domestic Relations Law states very
generally:
A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior or
subsequent to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil
or religious marriage, or shall have consummated a common-law
marriage where such marriage is recognized as valid, in the manner
authorized by the law of the place where such marriage takes place,
is the legitimate child of both natural parents notwithstanding that
such marriage is void or voidable or has been or shall hereafter be
annulled or judicially declared void.147

There is no gender-specific language in the statute.148 By the
plain language of the law, if gay marriage were legal in New
York, and two women legally married, if one of the women gave
birth to a child, the presumption of the law would be that both
women were the natural, legitimate parents of the child.149 As
the Lewis court in New Jersey suggested, this type of presumed
legitimacy would provide a child of gay parents with a variety
of rights (for example, survivor rights under Worker’s
Compensation) that would flow not only through the birth144

See, e.g., In Re Adoption of a Child Whose First Name Is Evan, 583
N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1992).
145
See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 102, at 372 n.59 (“A second-parent adoption
can cost from $2,500 to $3,000.”).
146
N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 24(1) (McKinney 1999).
147
Id.
148
The gender-specific noun terms employed in marriage codes (i.e.,
consanguity provisions) are often crippling to gay couples claims of a right to marry.
E.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006). Even Massachusetts denied
relief under the plain language of the marriage laws. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Mental
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003).
149
See discussion of Johnson v. Calvert, supra Part III; see also comments
regarding the definition of “legitimate” supra note 108.
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giving parent, but through both parents had they been legally
married.150
With the discriminatory access to presumed legitimacy
made clear and the potential remedy established (that is, gay
marriage), the final hurdle to proving an equal protection
violation would be the language of the state constitution. The
New York Constitution’s equal protection clause is simple and
concise in its wording: “No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof.”151 The New York court held in Hernandez that gay
marriage could be outlawed because restricting which couples
could marry aided policies born out of “the undisputed
assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of
children.”152 The inference to be drawn is that the marriage
code is primarily meant to protect children. However, if the law
is designed to protect children, it must do so equally under
New York’s equal protection clause.153 Therefore, a child (or the
parents on that child’s behalf) could presumably challenge the
unequal application of the marriage laws, claiming the law
creates inequitable distinctions based on legitimacy. This
argument, if successful, would warrant review of the marriage
law under intermediate scrutiny,154 circumnavigating the
Hernandez court’s reluctance to apply intermediate scrutiny
based on gender inequality.155
The central question before the court in such a
challenge would be whether the marriage law discriminates on
the basis of legitimacy. A differentiation is made between
children born into wedlock and those born outside of wedlock:
namely, those born into wedlock are presumed to be the

150
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006) (“We fail to see any
legitimate governmental purpose in disallowing the child of a deceased same-sex
parent survivor benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act or Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act when children of married parents would be entitled to such benefits.
Nor do we see the governmental purpose in not affording the child of a same-sex
parent, who is a volunteer firefighter or first-aid responder, tuition assistance when the
children of married parents receive such assistance. There is something distinctly
unfair about the State recognizing the right of same-sex couples to raise natural and
adopted children and placing foster children with those couples, and yet denying those
children the financial and social benefits and privileges available to children in
heterosexual households.”).
151
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
152
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
153
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
154
See supra Part III.
155
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10.
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natural children of the couple.156 This presumption then
immediately engenders the right of the child to draw certain
responsibilities from those parents. Therefore, the flow of the
rights to the child is transitive: if marriage, then legitimacy; if
legitimacy, then rights. Without marriage rights for the
parents, a child cannot derive benefits from a non-birth-giving
partner without a long and costly adoption process. This
burdens the child in a way that a child legitimized by married
parents is not. While the marriage statute does not
discriminate on the basis of legitimacy directly, by determining
that marital children get one benefit and nonmarital children
another, it forcibly classifies certain children into the category
of illegitimate when the law prohibits those children’s parents
from marrying each other.157 The marriage law, more than
drawing distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate
children, creates these distinctions of illegitimacy that would
not otherwise exist. These distinctions carry with them what
the Supreme Court called a “condemnation on the head of an
infant [that] is illogical and unjust.”158 While this type of lawcreated illegitimacy has never been considered by any court,
the inescapable deprivation of rights faced by the children of
gay parents is contrary to the policies looked to previously by
the Supreme Court in ruling that questions of legitimacy
deserved intermediate scrutiny.159 For this reason, coupled with
New York’s history of supporting unique family structures,160 a
court might rule that a child’s equal protection claim warrants
intermediate review.
2. Applying the Standard
If a New York court applied the intermediate standard
of review to a challenge of the law on illegitimacy grounds, any
law barring gay marriage would have to be proven
substantially related to an important government objective.161
156

N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 24(1) (1969).
It is a standard evidentiary principle that “[t]here is a presumption that a
child born in wedlock, that is, while the mother was united with a husband in
marriage . . . is legitimate.” 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Domestic Relations § 843. Therefore, the
opposite must be true—a child born to unwed parents is presumed illegitimate.
158
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
159
See supra Part III.
160
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 421.16(h)(2) (2007); Braschi v.
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989).
161
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
157
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The Court of Appeals’ analysis in Hernandez would thereby
recoil upon itself. In Hernandez, the court enumerated two
important government objectives believed to be at the core of
the marriage law’s distinction between homosexual and
heterosexual couples: promotion of procreation and promotion
of dual sex parenting.162
Despite the first proffered motive, the promotion of
childbirth may be undermined by forbidding gay marriage.
Because lesbian couples without the benefit of marriage do not
enjoy the advantages of presumed dual parentage, these
couples might decide to forego plans to conceive using
alternative reproductive measures. Deterring homosexuals
from conceiving children might achieve the desired result of
promoting dual sex parenting, but such an effort ignores the
reality of the same-sex parenting already in place in the United
States.163 Simply because the legislature may want to increase
the number of children being raised by both a mother and a
father, it cannot wash away the inherent federal constitutional
right of homosexual Americans to procreate.164 The state cannot
pursue its objective in opposition to rights guaranteed at the
federal level.165 Homosexual women in this country can, and
will, continue to have children, meaning that children will in
fact be raised by same-sex parents. The state would essentially
have to claim that treating similarly situated children
differently is substantially related to discouraging Americans
from exercising their fundamental right to procreate. It seems
unlikely that any court would hold that state equal protection
rights can be legislated around in order to deter people from
exercising a fundamental right protected by the Federal Due
Process Clause.166 Therefore, if held to the intermediate
standard of review, it appears plausible that a child’s equal
protection claim could invalidate anti-gay marriage legislation,
if the government cannot offer more important objectives than
those relied upon in Hernandez.

162

Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
See supra notes 118-121.
164
See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
165
U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
166
See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
163
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The Benefit of a Child’s Equal Protection Challenge—
Reframing the Social Debate

An equal protection challenge brought by a child might
also be successful for non-legal reasons. Specifically, a child’s
argument that she deserves an equal opportunity to be
legitimized by her gay parents, in the same way her peers born
to married heterosexual parents are already legitimized, could
create a shift in the social and moral framework of the gay
marriage debate.
To date, the debate over gay marriage in the public
square has been largely cantankerous. The opponents of gay
marriage unabashedly proclaim “that marriage is between a
man and a woman, as God and nature intended.”167 These antigay marriage advocates often cite religious and moral
convictions for the basis of their firmly held beliefs.168 On the
other side, advocates of gay marriage, often feeling personally
attacked, resort to oversimplified name calling, for example,
calling anti-gay marriage advocates “homophobic bigots”
(especially common in the internet “blogosphere”).169 Too often
there seems to be little common ground to be found.
However, one would be hard pressed to find an
individual who does not want all children to receive adequate
care. In the United States there is an increasing incidence of
children being raised in single-family homes as well as a
corresponding incidence of increased divorce.170 And while there
are those who undoubtedly disapprove of homosexual couples
raising children,171 it is an unalterable reality that gay couples
are raising children172 and that all Americas have a right to
procreate if they so chose.173 So the new question, in a debate
over children’s equal protection rights, would be “How can the
167
Pat Buchanan, Time for a New Boston Tea Party, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 85, 85 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
2d ed. 2004).
168
See, e.g., PETER SPRIGG, OUTRAGE: HOW GAY ACTIVISTS AND LIBERAL
JUDGES ARE TRASHING DEMOCRACY TO REDEFINE MARRIAGE 112-17 (2004).
169
See, e.g., Posting of Pam Spaulding to Pamspaulding.com, http://
www.pamspaulding.com/weblog/2004_11_01_pamspaulding_archive.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2007) (on file with author) (disparaging conservative stalwart Phil Burress for
his support of Ohio’s gay marriage ban).
170
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN? 22
(Cheryl D. Hayes et al. eds., 1990).
171
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
172
See supra Part IV.A.
173
See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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state best accommodate the needs of children raised by gay
parents who deserve the benefits of legitimacy and dual
parentage?” One unmistakable way to give children those
benefits is by allowing their parents to marry.174 By framing the
debate in these terms, the focus shifts to the rights of children
with whom no one can possibly find moral fault. If the debate
were to move in this new direction and gain traction, this nonlegal concept, together with the unique legal posturing of the
proposed equal protection claim, could forever change the gay
marriage debate on both the state and federal levels.
V.

POTENTIAL FEDERAL IMPLICATIONS OF A CHILD’S
EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

If a state like New York were to entertain both the
aforementioned policy goals and the premise of invalidating its
gay marriage ban based on Equal Protection claims raised by
the children of homosexual couples, it would undoubtedly open
a new wave of speculation regarding gay marriage and the
Federal Constitution. To date, at least twenty-six states have
added amendments to their state constitutions which serve to
effectively preclude gay marriage.175 In addition, the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act gives each state the right to refuse to
recognize marriages sanctioned by other states.176 Regardless,

174

See supra Part IV.B.
For a detailed state-by-state list, including voting results, of all anti-gay
marriage amendments enacted through 2004, see Baker, supra note 74, at 239-42.
Additionally, seven states passed amendments in the most recent
midterm election on November 7, 2006. See Will Sullivan, Voters Ban Gay Marriage,
Back Minimum Wage, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORTS, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061108/8ballot.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2007). For a complete, though unofficial, breakdown of the status of gay marriage in all
fifty U.S. states, see Same-Sex Marriage Status in the United States by Statute,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_state_laws_on_same-sex_unions (last visited Oct.
14, 2007).
In addition to state constitutional amendments, some have proposed an
amendment to the Federal Constitution that would define marriage as only occurring
between one man and one woman. See Christopher Wolfe, Why the Federal Marriage
Amendment Is Necessary, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895, 895 (2005). However, even the
amendment’s proponents do not believe its passage is likely, if only because amending
the Constitution is such an arduous a task. Id.
176
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). Its two separate statutory provisions follow:
175

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
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under the Supremacy Clause, no state constitution may offend
the Federal Constitution.177 Therefore, if a state like New York
adopted the view that a ban on gay marriage violated equal
protection by drawing distinctions based on the forced
illegitimacy of the children born to gay couples, it would be
inevitable that a similar claim would be brought in federal
court in an attempt to convince the Supreme Court to adopt
this view as well. If successful, a single lawsuit could force
every state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage to
be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny and possibly eradicate
them all.
However, because not all anti-gay marriage amendments are worded identically, the effects of a child’s successful
Equal Protection claim would be felt differently state by state.
To understand this differentiation it is necessary to classify the
various state amendments and analyze each permutation
accordingly. In his article, “Status, Substance, and Structure,”
Joshua Baker considered each of the state marriage
amendments in place as of 2005.178 The framework he proposes
classifies them into three distinct types: status amendments,
substance amendments, and structure amendments.179 Each
type of amendment would likely have its own unique strengths
and weaknesses when held to the test of intermediate scrutiny.
Therefore, each of these three types of amendments will be
addressed in turn.
To begin, the so-called substance amendments have
been adopted by at least ten states.180 The typical text of a
substance amendment reads: “Marriage in this state consists
“spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws
of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising
from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
177
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (striking down on equal
protection grounds Colorado’s constitutional amendment prohibiting state legislation
enacted to protect homosexuals from discrimination); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
178
See Baker, supra note 74, at 223-37.
179
Id. at 222.
180
Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. Id. at 240-42.
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only of the union between a man and a woman. No other
relationship shall be recognized as a marriage by this state or
its political subdivisions, or given a substantially equivalent
legal status.”181 These amendments are particularly troubling
in the context of an equal protection challenge made by a child.
The language precluding the possibility of an “equivalent legal
status” is destructive because it leaves no opening for any of
the rights associated with marriage, including the presumption
of legitimacy, to become attached to a homosexual relationship.
The complete barring of equivalent status leaves these
amendments open to possible federal repeal if challenged by a
child bringing a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Federal Constitution.182
The other two types of amendments are similar to each
other and, due to more benign wording, would presumably
stand a better chance of surviving the Equal Protection
challenge proposed herein. So-called status amendments
typically read, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in this state.”183 Meanwhile, Hawaii’s
amendment, the only so-called structural amendment, simply
vests the power to define marriage exclusively with the
legislature.184 These two amendment forms, while furthering
the governmental interest in protecting traditional marriage,
still leave open the possibility that a child of gay parents could
be legitimized by some legislative action other than conferral of
full marriage rights.185 These types of amendments stand a
better chance than the substance amendments of surviving a
successful Equal Protection claim brought by a child of gay
parents.186 However, allowing gay parents to legitimize children
born during their partnership would clearly necessitate the
creation of some form of status equivalent to marriage for
181

Id. at 239.
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Equal Protection Clause is reverse incorporated against the federal
government under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
183
Baker, supra note 74, at 239.
184
HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
185
See infra note 193 and accompanying text (noting some possible remedies,
short of full gay marriage rights, that may help rectify the disparate treatment faced
by children raised in households with same-sex parents).
186
For this reason, opponents of gay marriage should take note that the more
malleable status and structure amendments may be preferable in the future due to
their ability to weather various types of constitutional challenges.
182

2008]

SECURING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS

725

homosexual relationships. Since this may not happen in any
particular state, a court might find that the potential harm to
the illegitimate children of gay parents is disproportionate
to the government’s interest enshrined in these amendments.
If a child could successfully bring an Equal Protection claim
invalidating a state anti-gay marriage law, all these
constitutional amendments, including the substance and
structure amendments, may be susceptible to judicial repeal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The gay marriage debate shows no signs of fading from
the public consciousness.187 The bulk of the case law on this
issue has been brought by gay couples on their own behalf with
varying success188 and with a considerable amount of
backlash.189 Today there is no shortage of industrious lawyers
advocating on behalf of homosexual couples across the
country.190 And with courts continuing to focus on the nexus
between marriage and childrearing,191 it seems likely that some
lawyer seeking a unique challenge will try her hand at arguing
a claim similar to the one described herein.192 For these
reasons, a claim to invalidate anti-gay marriage laws and
amendments brought by a child of gay parents seems
inevitable.
For proponents of gay marriage, the most logical
approach will be to attempt to cloak the question in the clothes
of legitimacy in order to take advantage of intermediate
scrutiny review. For opponents of gay marriage, this approach
will raise new concerns. There are other potential ways to
confer legitimacy on children without the need for marriage, for
example, through pre-birth decrees and the little-known

187
See, e.g., KGO-TV/DT, abc7news.com, Gay Marriage Cases Moving to State
Supreme Court (Nov. 7, 2006), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news&id=
4738006 (noting that the California Supreme Court is preparing to hear its own round
of challenges to domestic partnerships).
188
See supra Part II.
189
See generally Ball, supra note 75; Baker, supra note 74.
190
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 946-7 (Mass.
2003) (naming approximately fifty attorneys who worked to complete over twenty-five
briefs for submission to the Massachusetts Supreme Court in reference to the
Goodridge case alone).
191
See supra Part II.
192
See supra Part IV.
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doctrine of parent by estoppel.193 These obscure techniques for
bestowing expanded parent-to-child rights could be used more
frequently and codified into law to lessen the harm caused to
the children of gay parents born without the presumption of
legitimacy. However, social conservatives at odds with gay
marriage may find themselves uneasy about facilitating gay
parentage by eliminating cross-adoption costs in the interest of
establishing dual parentage for the children of gay couples.194
Moreover, full marriage rights for gay parents seem to be the
most direct way to ensure the full flow of marital benefits to
the thousands of children being raised in gay households.
If a child brings the Equal Protection claims described
herein, it is likely that the new battleground of the gay
marriage war will be over the amendment of state laws
concerning the presumption of legitimacy and the narrow
tailoring of all gay marriage-related constitutional amendments
and legislation.195 Such a challenge would also likely reopen the
debate over a federal constitutional amendment.196
In the meantime, for the sake of the children, both sides
of the debate should be prepared to do whatever is necessary to
provide what is best for all children, regardless of who their
parents are. Gay marriage is not only about gay rights, but also
family rights: the rights of parents to claim their children as
193
See Osbourne, supra note 102, at 371-89 (discussing various child custody
options open to gay parents including pre-birth decrees and parent by estoppel).
Parent by estoppel is a fascinating concept:

According to the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel is one who, although
not a biological or adoptive parent:
[L]ived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full
and permanent responsibility as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting
agreement with the child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with
full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition
of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or
[L]ived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full
and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with
the child’s parent . . ., when the court finds that recognition of the individual
as a parent is in the child’s best interests.
Once a co-parent meets these circumstantial requirements of parent by
estoppel, the co-parent has the rights and privileges of a legal parent,
including standing to bring an action for custody.
Id. at 389.
194

See supra Part IV.C (discussing the moral and religious objection to gay

marriage).
195
See supra Part V (noting the differences between status, substance, and
structural amendments with regard to constitutional analysis).
196
See supra notes 175-176.
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their own and the rights of children to do the same with their
parents. The gay marriage debate is already fourteen years old
and counting, but the kids have yet to have their say.
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